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Abstract
The proliferation of nationalist political parties in the developed world continues to challenge the
integrity of some of the world’s most stable democracies. In Canada and Belgium, both countries
have experienced the challenge of nationalist parties in the province of Quebec and region of
Flanders respectively. However, in both cases, there are now at least two nationalist political
parties that both support the idea of independence for both Quebec and Flanders. This nationalist
party “diffusion” further challenges the integrity of the Canadian and Belgian states.
The Parti Quebecois has served as the main sponsor of nationalism in the province of
Quebec. However, another nationalist party, Quebec solidaire, has also recently begun to win
support in the National Assembly. Vlaams Belang (VB) has played a similar role in trying to
obtain independence for Flanders. However, Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA) also recently
adopted the platform of independence and recently won the most votes (and seats) in the 2010
Belgian general election. This diffusion of nationalist parties has caused strains on the respective
governments of Canada and Belgium respectively. In both cases this has not yet resulted in
secession or the dissolution of the state, but challenges remain to the unity of both states.
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Introduction
The structure of the state in both Canada and Belgium has long been challenged by
supporters of secession in Quebec and Flanders respectively, but agitation to create new,
sovereign states has been heightened in recent years with the creation of new political parties setup with the purpose of obtaining de jure independence. Secession can be defined as “the formal
withdrawal from a central authority by a member unit” (Wood 1981, 110) and supporters of
secession in Quebec and Flanders have created political parties to purport this platform in the
political dialogue of their respective regions. Not only do both Quebec and Flanders have one
major political party that advocates outright independence, but within the last decade, a second
political party has also been created with the specific platform of independence, and both of
these parties have risen in popularity such that they now regularly win seats in the regional
legislature. There has been a diffusion of the secessionist idea that has spread to other people
within Quebec and Flanders, especially with different ideological views on other matters related
to the state such as social or economic issues.
From its founding in 1968, the Parti Quebecois (PQ) has long contested the Canadian
state by promoting independence for Quebec. The PQ has, at times, been quite popular in
Quebec, even winning numerous provincial elections, governing the province, and holding two
referendums on the possibility of Quebec independence. In 2006, Quebec Solidaire (QS) was
founded to provide an alternative to the traditional framework of politics in Quebec, but the party
also adopted the same platform as the PQ—to obtain independence for Quebec. In Belgium, the
original Flemish nationalist party, Vlaams Belang (VB), was created in 1977 and has similarly
served to contest the Belgian state. VB holds very different political views from the PQ and QS,
but the raison d’etre remains the same—independence. Unlike the PQ, VB has never governed
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in Flanders, but the party often wins over 10 percent of the popular vote in the region, even
within a crowded political field. In addition to VB, another political party, Nieuw-Vlaamse
Alliantie (N-VA) was founded in 2001, but joined Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams (CD&V) in
a coalition. Only recently has N-VA disentangled itself from the coalition with CD&V and, in
more explicit ways, the party has expressed support for independence, providing another case of
nationalist/secessionist party diffusion.
In these two countries, existing nationalist parties have been joined by other nationalist
parties as a means to contesting the Canadian and Belgian states. 1 There is no evidence yet that
nationalist support has—or will—increase dramatically, but both Canada and Belgium face
further contestation as a result of nationalist/secessionist party diffusion. This situation provokes
two questions that will be considered in this paper: what policy platforms have been developed
by the respective nationalist/secessionist parties in Quebec and Flanders as a means of diffusing
the idea of secession? And, does the diffusion of nationalist/secessionist parties further threaten
the existence of Canada and Belgium?

Secessionist political parties
In many countries throughout the world, secessionist movements exist as a means of
lobbying for the creation of a new independent state. In free, democratic countries, secessionist
political parties take on the role of lobby for the cause of independence; most
nationalist/secessionist movements or political parties in free, democratic countries do not resort
to violence, but violent outcomes have occurred in Northern Ireland, the Basque Country, and
Corsica. For the most part, however, the goal of secession, in the developed world, is a peaceful
1

The same is true of Catalonia in Spain with at least two different political parties supporting some form of
independence or greater autonomy for the region. Further field research—tentatively scheduled for June 2013—
could lead to the incorporation of Catalonia as a third case study in this research paper.
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process especially where there are democratic opportunities to express dissatisfaction with the
state.
Secession is extremely rare in the developed world (Dion 1996) and has not occurred
since the creation of the Irish Free State as a dominion of the British Empire in 1921 (more
formally as an independent state in 1937). However, secession has occurred on numerous
occasions recently: South Sudan (2011), Montenegro (2006), East Timor (2002), Eritrea (1993),
as well as the Eastern Europe break-ups of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union.
All of these cases, however, were outside of the context of a free ("Freedom in the World."
(1991); "Freedom in the World" (2012)), democratic process wherein nationalist/secessionist
political parties existed in the political spectrum, won or lost votes amongst the public, won seats
in parliament, governed the region, and then advocated independence either through a
referendum or a dissolution of the state. Secession was not easy in any of the aforementioned
cases—some of the peoples suffered greatly—but the process was different and typically
mandated or guided by the United Nations or the European Union.
One of the major factors in democratic politics in the developed world has been the lack
of successful secessions through lobbying by nationalist/secessionist political parties. In a range
of developed, democratic countries, political parties exist with the explicit (and sometimes
implicit) desire to create an independent state. However, none of them have been successful in
attaining their goal. Traditional nationalist/secessionist political parties have tried for decades to
achieve their goal of independence, but all parties have thus far failed to achieve their maximalist
goal. In reaction to this impasse, a new idea is beginning to emerge amongst supporters of
secession, the diffusion—creation of two or more—secessionist political parties. Since secession
has been so unsuccessful amongst nationalist political parties in developed states, two questions
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arise, as noted in the introduction. This paper will investigate the diffusion of secessionist
political parties and provide answers to the question of likelihood for independence.

Diffusion
As already noted, both Canada and Belgium, in recent years, have experienced
nationalist/secessionist “diffusion” given the increased number of parties also utilizing the
platform of independence. Diffusion has a range of different meanings and interpretations, but in
the context of this paper, diffusion is taken to mean the transmission of one idea/policy platform:
independence, to other political parties and other national contexts. There are two case studies in
this paper: Quebec and Flanders, both of which had just one political party seeking
independence, and now both regions have two. Not only has the idea of independence been
diffused from one national context to another—and also to many other national contexts in the
developed world—but multiple political parties with different ideological stances have also
adopted the same idea. As a result, this diffusion of nationalist parties has caused strains on the
respective governments of Canada and Belgium respectively and further complicates the political
discussions and debates in Quebec and Flanders.
Diffusion does not mean that Quebec and/or Flanders will become independent. In fact,
the diffusion of secessionist support may actually serve to undercut the independence movement
in both regions. However, the diffusion of the idea of independence means that the concept is
being implemented by more than one political party.
This paper seeks to add to the discussion on diffusion as part of the conference theme on
diffusion helping to provide more answers to pressing questions on the diffusion of ideas, why
diffusion is so difficult to predict, and what explains the different rates of diffusion across a
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range of different cases. By providing information on two nationalist/secessionist political parties
in two different national cases, comparison becomes possible as a means to interact with the
broader questions posed on diffusion in this conference.

Methodology
This paper builds on previously completed dissertation research on secessionism in
Flanders and Quebec by investigating new parties in both regions (Duerr 2012). Originally, the
research examined the roles of the PQ and VB, but N-VA was also examined in the research as
the party became more electorally successful. Since the completion of the research, N-VA has
continued to gain support and recently had numerous successes in Belgian municipal elections in
October 2012. An update on N-VA is necessary because the party has become the most popular
party in Belgium and the party has played an important role (or lack thereof) in the life of recent
Belgian politics. In Quebec, the development of QS has not yet been nearly as dramatic, but the
party has grown into a more significant political force in Quebec politics winning a greater
percentage of the votes and more seats in the National Assembly (as noted later in Table 1). QS
is newer than N-VA and could serve to challenge the traditional political forces in the province
in the future.
This paper employs a range of different qualitative methods in the investigation of case
studies in Flanders and Quebec. The research is triangulated with elite political interviews, an
investigation of primary, electronic source information from party websites, and a compilation of
election results in which nationalist/secessionist parties competed. Using three different methods
of data collection, the research was triangulated to provide greater validity and robustness
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(Maykut and Morehouse 1994, 146). By taking several different views of a particular question,
more nuances can be discovered in the research (Gibbs 2007, 94).
The original field research was completed in both Quebec and Flanders throughout 2010
inclusive of twenty-seven formal elite level interviews of members of the PQ (and also the Bloc
Quebecois at the federal level), VB, and N-VA. At that time, QS was not a major force in
Quebecois politics, but became more popular following the September 2012 provincial election.
Further research is anticipated in both regions in the forthcoming years.
Further research for this paper utilizes primary research from the respective websites of
each party in their discussions of secession from their respective states. The platform of
independence effectively provides the overarching ambition for all parties studied here such that
the thought of independence is ubiquitous throughout all political platforms and provides the
basis from which policy platforms should be considered. A reading of each website provides a
basic overview of what a political party considers important and the way independence is
described (Quebecsolidaire.net; pq.org; blocquebecois.org; vlaamsbelang.org; n-va.be). A
website also provides a sense of how a political party presents itself and the values that the party
holds. Although the appearance and policy platforms on a website have major limitations,
something more formal is presented about the party and their respective desires to lead their
region to de jure international recognition and independence.
Finally, this paper also utilizes election results to show how support for
nationalist/secessionist parties has changed over time, as noted in three tables depicting relevant
national and/or regional election results. The results were collected from official elections sites in
both Canada and Belgium to show the support gained for the various political parties. These
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tables compare how the first (oldest) nationalist/secessionist party compares to the other (newer)
party, and to show how nationalist diffusion has influenced politics in both regions.
There are weaknesses in each type of method of data collection, but in triangulating the
data, this paper provides some verification through repeatability of investigation through
different research methods (Stake 2008, 133). Interviews have many strengths since the opinion
presented in this case is by an elite-level politician and policymaker (Gorden 2006); however,
interviews are limited in the sense that a person has biases, and human capacities are limited in
terms of memory. Primary research from websites is a very strong method of obtaining
information, but there are limitations as to the depth of discussion surrounding policy platforms
because parties rarely engage in in-depth discussions of policy on a website. Finally, survey data
is strong because it provides descriptive statistics of the performance of different political parties.
However, elections results do not show the nuances of what happened in a given election, or how
polling fluctuated. With any election, there is a broader story that unfolds in front of the public
and the results merely show the outcome of a long and, typically, hard fought campaign in which
numerous political candidates had the opportunity to attract or dissuade voters from supporting
their respective political parties.

Quebec
Quebec is one of Canada’s ten provinces and is probably most renowned throughout the
world for being the only major Francophone speaking region of North America. This fact speaks
to an eclectic history through the French colonial period in North America, to language politics,
and to the politics of federalism. Quebec has long had an uneasy relationship with the rest of
Canada; for example, Quebec is the only province that has not signed onto the 1982 Charter of
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Rights and Freedoms, most provinces in Canada are not officially bilingual, and nascent forms of
violent protest has erupted through Les Patriotes in the 1830s and the Front du Liberation du
Quebec (FLQ) in the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, many Quebecers also note the
advantages of being within Canada, of respect and equality under the Constitution, and with the
federal structure of the state providing some autonomy to the province and to the provincial
government; in fact, Quebec has long enjoyed more autonomy than other similarly placed
subnational units (Beland and Lecours 2005, 682). Canada is a wealthy country and the people of
Quebec are not oppressed by the Canadian government, can work and succeed within the current
national context, and are not discriminated against institutionally.
Quebec has a population of just over 8 million people and so comparisons with other
small countries are rife amongst members of the PQ and QS. The province has become,
sovereigntists 2 (supporters of independence) argue, a region that would resemble some of the
most progressive—in terms of social welfare—countries in Western Europe and Scandinavia.
Sovereigntists 3 make the assertion that an independent Quebec would have an exceptionally high
standard of living once it was allowed to dictate its own policies. Opponents of secession argue
that Quebec would be significantly poorer and isolated from the rest of North America.
Quebec sovereigntists have publicly asserted a platform for independence for decades,
and privately since the end of the Seven Years War. They argue that Canada has not given, and
will not give, Quebec enough political autonomy, but measures for autonomy are difficult to
operationalize. If substantial autonomy is given, then why does a region need a separate state
(Ignatieff 2010)? Therefore, on the issue of autonomy, there is still an uneasy relationship in
2

Members of the PQ and BQ describe themselves using this term, rather than as nationalists or as separatists, both
of which they consider somewhat pejorative.
3
The discussion of views amongst supporters of an independent Quebec, at from the PQ (or BQ) is informed by
formal interviews conducted in the province in 2010. A full list of interviewees can be seen in Appendix A at the
end of the paper.
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Quebec, which continues to foster some political animosity. Many sovereigntists want more
autonomy, perhaps even a federacy model wherein Quebec would be more autonomous than all
other provinces, but very few federalists are willing to concede any more autonomy to Quebec.
The PQ’s creation in 1968 from two major Quebec independence promoting
organizations provided a sense of formal contestation over the status of Quebec within Canada
when the party first competed for political office in 1970. Despite being a new party in Quebec’s
political arena, the PQ quickly won support amongst the electorate, and that growing support led
to victory at the 1976 provincial election. Party leader, Rene Levesque, and his relatively
unknown group of candidates then had to govern the province and Levesque became the premier
(premier ministre of Quebec).
The provincial election victory in 1976 was just one of several victories for the PQ in
which the party gained a majority in the National Assembly. On two separate occasions—in both
1980 and 1995—the PQ was the majority party in the National Assembly and, as a result of their
superior position, the party was able to enact a bill to hold a referendum. These referendums
were used to decide the constitutional fate of Quebec and, by proxy, Canada. On both occasions,
the voters of Quebec decided to vote against outright independence for the province. In 1980, the
“yes” campaign, supported by Rene Leveque’s PQ managed to obtain only 40 percent support
from Quebecers. The vote was very close in 1995, however, with 49.4 percent of Quebecers
casting a vote in favor of independence, a mere difference of 53,000 votes (Doran 1996, 99).
Despite the referendum losses, the PQ has maintained a prominent position within the political
system of Quebec that has proven durable and has lasted over the course of several decades.
Even after the referendum-association loss in 1980, for example, the PQ won again the next year
(Clarke 1983, 64).
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In virtually every election, the PQ has finished either first or second (behind the Liberal
Party of Quebec [the PLQ]) with the exception of the 2007 provincial election in which the PQ
was roundly defeated by the PLQ and the upstart Action Démocratique du Québec (ADQ). After
arriving on the political scene in 1970, the PQ has retained a prominent position and despite not
winning a referendum, the party has remained popular in the system. In some ways, this provides
an ongoing challenge for both Quebec and Canada, a sense of being in limbo between two very
different situations, support for an independent Quebec or support for the future of all people
residing within Canada regardless of linguistic heritage.
The Union des Forces Progressives (UFP) was formed in 2002 as a left-wing alternative
to politics in Canada. Supporters of UFP claimed that the other political parties in Quebec: PQ,
PLQ, and ADQ were all supportive of free trade and a wider neoliberal economic model. UFP
was, in part, created to provide an alternative for voters in Quebec. Support for the party was
marginal in the beginning and the party was later superseded by the creation of QS in 2006. QS
has attempted to create political space on the left of the political spectrum by similarly
condemning the PQ, PLQ, and the Coalition Avenir du Quebec (CAQ) (the successor party,
essentially, for ADQ). QS promotes a range of different policy platforms juxtaposed on the idea
of independence. The party supports what it claims are overlooked areas of policy such as
environmentalism, feminism, anti-globalization, and immigration among others
(Quebecsolidaire.net).
Despite the addition of the UFP in the 2003 provincial election—and QS for the 2007
provincial election—support for nationalist parties has declined from its zenith in 1981 when the
PQ obtained just under 50 percent of the vote. Moreover, since the diffusion of
nationalist/secessionist parties, the PQ and QS taken together have not won over 50 percent of
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the votes in Quebec. Although the PQ now governs Quebec with a minority government—after
winning the 2012 provincial election—the party is not in a position to hold a third referendum on
independence without the support of the CAQ. Moreover, QS has not yet developed enough of
an electoral presence to win enough seats in the National Assembly to constitute any real sense
of support for policy platforms.

Table 1: Nationalist/Secessionist party votes in Quebec provincial elections, 1970-present
Year

PQ

QS

TOTAL

2012

31.95% (54)^

6.03% (2)

37.98%

2008

35.17% (51)

3.78% (1)

38.95%

2007

28.35% (36)

3.64% (0)

31.99%

2003

33.24% (45)

1.06% (0)

34.30%

1998

42.87% (76)*

-

42.87%

1994

44.75% (77)*

-

44.75%

1989

40.16% (29)

-

40.16%

1985

38.69% (23)

-

38.69%

1981

49.20% (80)*

-

49.20%

1976

41.37% (71)*

-

41.37%

1973

30.22% (6)

-

30.22%

1970

23.06% (7)

-

23.06%

*= formed majority provincial government
^= formed minority provincial government
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Table One shows the changes in support with regards to Quebec’s nationalist/secessionist
political parties over time from results provided by Elections Quebec. The high point of support
came in the 1981 provincial election when the PQ won almost 50 percent of the vote. However,
it is noteworthy that the PQ won over 40 percent of the vote on five occasions—most recently in
1998. Since the emergence of Qs, however, total support for nationalist/secessionist political
parties has not surpassed the 40 percent threshold suggesting that the diffusion of the idea of
independence may be correlated to a decline in support. There is not enough evidence to
statistically support this correlation, but the basic election results show descriptive statistics of a
decline in nationalist/secessionist support even with the diffusion of the idea of independence to
another political party.
It should be noted, however, that at the present time the PQ governs the province in a
minority situation and, it should be further noted that QS has gained an inroad in the electorate
winning more than 6 percent of the vote in 2012. Even though nationalists/secessionists
technically have power in Quebec, it is unlikely, at the present time that this will lead to a
referendum without a significant change in policy from either CAQ or PLQ. Table One does,
however, provide evidence of increased support for QS and it will be important to follow the
party into the future. If QS continues to gain more support as a percentage of overall voters, then
another party/other parties will lose support. Much depends on where QS makes its gains. If
support is gained from dissatisfied PQ voters, then the nationalist movement will remain as it is
now. If, however, support for QS is gained from PLQ or CAQ voters, then the nationalist
movement will grow and the challenge to the Canadian state will become more acute.
The emergence of QS is, in some ways, a surprise. The PQ occupies part of the centerleft of the political spectrum in Quebec and QS has emerged to the left of the PQ. The other
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aspect of QS’s policies is that the party is difficult to pin down. QS is not a communist party and
is further to the center on the political spectrum, but QS is still to the left of PQ, making the case
that the PQ is just like the other parties in Quebec. This divide between the
nationalist/secessionist parties will be interesting to watch over time, especially if both parties
collectively constitute a majority in Quebec’s National Assembly at some point in the future.
In summarizing the answers gained in this case study towards the two questions posed at
the outset of this paper—what policy platforms have been developed by the respective
nationalist/secessionist parties in Quebec and Flanders as a means of diffusing the idea of
secession? And, does the diffusion of nationalist/secessionist parties further threaten the
existence of Canada and Belgium?—some answers are clear and others less clear. To start with
the second question, support for independence has decreased even with the diffusion of
nationalist/secessionist political parties because combined electoral support has not surpassed 40
percent since 1998. For the first question, regarding specific policy platforms, QS has attempted
to create political space on the left of the political spectrum by introducing, what it argues, are
new and often overlooked questions. Given fairly tepid levels of support, this political space is
not yet clear to most voters in Quebec, but this can change over time. For many people in
Quebec, on a pragmatic level, the choice between the PQ and QS is simply left and further left;
the nuance has not yet been fully developed by QS such that it has become entrenched in Quebec
politics.
Flanders
The Flemish region in the north of Belgium is noteworthy for being Dutch-speaking as
opposed to the southern Walloon region of Belgium, which is largely French speaking. Belgium
became an independent state in 1831 after gaining independence from the Kingdom of the
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Netherlands in a short-lived union that started in 1815 after the Napoleonic Wars. Language has
long been a dividing issue in Belgium, but has become more acute in recent decades with five
different state reforms and the rise of two nationalist parties in the region: VB and N-VA
(O’Neill 2000). Since 1970, Belgium has transformed from a unitary state into a fairly loose
federal state with several different subnational governments (Hooghe 2004, 55).
For Flemings, the greater autonomy granted to them is a major change from the past
where the structure of the Belgian state was a unitary state (Beland and Lecours 2005, 682). In
some ways, the changes in Belgium towards greater powers for Flemings has, ironically, made it
more difficult to gain independence since there are numerous institutional blockages that can be
implemented by the Belgium government, for example, no history or any known ability to hold a
referendum on independence. Flemish nationalists often decry the work of Walloons for this.
The changes to the structure of the state have provided Flemings with more autonomy, but, since
there is no real option to hold a referendum, independence will remain difficult.
The recent rise of N-VA, in some ways, can be explained by the support for
independence through the vehicle of a more extreme party, VB (often denoted as far right by
many scholars and people in Belgium). Supporters of independence from other positions on the
political spectrum had little choice historically but to vote for VB, or to vote another party that
did not support independence. For N-VA, then, the ability to attract voters from across the
political spectrum and to gain support from disaffected VB voters, has proven to be one reason
for their recent electoral success.
Nationalism has become an important factor in Belgium, especially with the rise of
Flanders as a distinct region with political support. It is also important to note, though, that
nationalism as an ideology also allows the Belgian state to exist and provides a sense of
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identification for the population of the country (Billig 1995, 15). Thus, nationalism is a doubleedged sword. Nationalism is necessary for the creation and sustention of a state, but challenges
to national identity can serve to make governance very difficult and undercut the stability of the
state. In modern, democratic states, it is rare that a challenge to national identity will produce
violence, or major instability, but the examples of Northern Ireland, the Basque Country, and
Corsica all present warnings. It is highly unlikely that Belgium will follow any of the
aforementioned examples, but political instability may cause more significant economic
problems in Belgium, especially if further challenges to governance continue.
The rise of nationalist parties in Belgium shows that there is a major undercurrent of
subnational sentiment opposed to the traditional state. In Table Two below, the regional elections
in Belgium are shown from 1995 to the most recent 2009 regional elections in Belgium. The first
column shows support for VB as a percentage of the total Flemish population, not the overall
Belgian population. In parenthesis is the number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies. (Senate
results are slightly different, but closely resemble Chamber results. In the second column, the
same statistics are shown for N-VA. Finally, a percentage total of all nationalist votes are
summed in the final column. It is noteworthy that N-VA was in an ongoing coalition with
CD&V through the 2004 election.
Table 2: Nationalist/secessionist party votes in Flemish regional elections, 1995-present
Year

VB

N-VA

Total

2009

15.3% (21)

13.1% (16)

28.4%

2004

24.2% (32)

Coalition with CD&V

24.2%

1999

15.5% (20)

-

15.5%

1995

12.3% (15)

-

12.3%
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As shown in Table Two, support for nationalist parties has steadily increased through the
mid-1990s into the 2000s in Flanders, culminating in 2009 with almost 30 percent of the vote.
Polls suggest that nationalist support could further increase in 2014, but this is merely a polling
statistic and not an actual election result. Although VB finished second in 2004, it is also
important to note that neither VB or N-VA has won a regional election, not has either party
governed the region. This presents a marked difference from the Quebec case.
In Flanders the diffusion of secessionist political parties at the regional level has
increased as a percentage but does not yet threaten the stability of the Flemish regional
government. The situation is different at the national level as noted in Table Three. At the
regional level, N-VA has not yet gained significant support in the Flemish regional parliament in
Brussels.
Table Three (shown below) is very similar to Table Two and presents many of the same
statistical results, only from the vantage point of national, rather than regional, elections. Again,
VB is shown in one column, N-VA in the next, and a sum total percentage of nationalist support
in the final column. Table Three is longer than Table Two because voting at the regional level
only started after the 1993 reform of the state (Hooghe 2004).
Table Three shows the history of VB in the Belgian political system and shows how the
party grew from its nascent beginnings in 1977 to become a more popular, entrenched party in
Belgium. Table Three also shows how VB declined significantly from the high point in 2004.
VB’s support has been cut in half since 2004 and some of this has happened as a result of NVA’s dramatic rise in the most recent 2010 national election. Nonetheless, when taken
collectively, support for nationalist parties has continued to increase to over 40 percent.
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Table 3: Nationalist/secessionist party votes in the Belgian elections, 1977-present
Year

VB

N-VA

Total

2010

12.30%

27.80%

40.10%

2007

19.22%

Coalition with CD&V

19.22%

2003

18.21%

4.91%

23.12%

1999

15.04%

-

15.04%

1995

7.83%

-

7.83%

1991

6.60%

-

6.60%

1987

1.90%

-

1.90%

1985

1.40%

-

1.40%

1981

1.12%

-

1.12%

Sources: elections.fgov.be; Vlaams Blok: 20 Jaar Rebel

Table Three shows the dramatic rise ascent of N-VA as a viable political party in the
Belgian system. The recent federal election result in 2010 indicates significant support for N-VA
and, potentially, for greater autonomy for Flanders if another reform of the state occurs in the
near future. Support for N-VA cannot be assumed as support for independence, but, obviously,
that decision depends on political elites within N-VA and their ability to debate and compromise
with other political elites in Belgium. Taken practically, votes for N-VA ultimately translate into
votes for independence, but only if Bart De Wever—the leader of N-VA—decides to formally
lobby for Flemish independence.
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Despite the rise of, N-VA, the new nationalist party in the Belgian political scene, VB
remains a major political party in Belgian politics and continues to influence the policy platforms
of other parties in the political system. Unless there is a dramatic change, VB is unlikely to serve
in a coalition government, but the party has, over time, built a strong party infrastructure and
regularly wins over half a million votes in Flanders. This level of support is noteworthy in a
country of just over 10 million people. The presence of VB on the political right in Flanders, by
virtue of its existence, changes the positions of all other parties, for better or worse.
VB was established in early 1977 as a means of revolting against the major Flemish party
of the time, Volksunie—a party created with the specific intention of advocating for greater
autonomy for the Flemish region. Support for VB in the beginning—especially in the period of
the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s—was minimal at best and VB did not play a substantial
role in the politics of Belgium. Most often, VB would only win just one or two seats at the
national level—in Belgium’s Chamber of Representatives and Senate (Hooghe 2004, 62;
Vlaams Blok: 10 Jaar Rebel). In the beginning, VB was known as Vlaams Blok until the party
lost a court case in 2004 on the ruling by the judge of inciting racial division. One of the rulings
of the court case is that the party had to disband because the party violated Belgian laws on
racism (Erk 2005). The old Vlaams Blok was reestablished in 2004 as Vlaams Belang. The new
VB then had a significant success in the 2004 election winning almost one-quarter of the vote in
Flanders. Since the zenith of 2004, support for VB has steadily declined, but the party has
maintained a position in the electoral system of Belgium, which continues to affect other parties
in Flanders, as well as the rest of the country.
N-VA is a new party, and in recent years joined in a coalition with CD&V, often forming
the most powerful party in Flanders or Belgium. Since the division of the two parties in the late
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2000s, N-VA has become very popular in Flanders. N-VA does not yet govern any major area,
but party leader, Bart De Wever, recently became mayor of Antwerp, one of the largest cities in
Belgium.
N-VA is a relatively new political party (formed in 2001) and has emerged recently as a
viable political choice in Belgium. The party has been able fill the electoral space in the political
spectrum when Volksunie, the preceding party that held similar political positions, declined, and
then disappeared. Analysts from N-VA—noted in the interviews—argued that room existed
between CD&V in the center/center-right of the political spectrum, and VB on the right/far-right;
the political field in Flanders is crowded, but N-VA has been able to find space between these
two parties and win votes. Entering the political spectrum in between CD&V and VB also meant
that N-VA had to initiate policy platforms that were different enough from both parties, but that
could attract votes. In many respects, N-VA borrowed key aspects of their rivals’ policy
platforms, and then changed the platforms to suit their electoral strategy. From VB, N-VA
similarly adopted the platform of independence, albeit, as noted earlier, with the strategy of
sovereignty (Interview with Jan Jambon, April 2010). From CD&V, N-VA adopted similar
policies on the key questions in Belgian politics regarding the Flemish relationship with
Walloons, immigration, and economics (Interview with Jan Jambon, April 2010).
Unlike Quebec, the Flemish nationalist parties occupy the right and center-right of the
political spectrum. VB has long been viewed as the most conservative—and often extreme—
party in Flanders, ranging from the right to the far-right depending on the source. N-VA,
however, is typically viewed as a center-right party and often stakes out more moderate policy
platforms as a means of distinguishing themselves from VB. This is not always true in practice,
but members of N-VA are quick to cite the differences between the two parties.

21

In examining the role of diffusion in nationalist/secessionist politics in Belgium, there are
answers to the two main questions posed in this paper—what policy platforms have been
developed by the respective nationalist/secessionist parties in Quebec and Flanders as a means of
diffusing the idea of secession? And, does the diffusion of nationalist/secessionist parties further
threaten the existence of Canada and Belgium?—that can be gleaned from this assessment.
Despite the historic role of VB as supporters of Flemish independence, diffusion of the
independence idea has led to a change in role for VB. As of 2010 general election, the results
show that there is evidence that N-VA has become a much more popular option for supporters of
independence, at least over VB. N-VA is a popular party right now, but a majority of Flemings
still voted for other parties in the last election. However, if nationalist/secessionist political
parties are directly compared given the issues of diffusion, the 2010 election results show that
some support has moved from VB to N-VA (Duerr 2012).
On the second question of diffusion of nationalism/secessionism further threatening the
stability of Belgium, there are a few noteworthy points. First, after the 2010 general election, it
took 541 days, for example, to create a coalition government given the success of N-VA as the
most popular party in Belgium; six other parties from Flanders and Wallonia formed a coalition
government without N-VA. A similar situation arose after the 2007 national election, in which it
took just under 200 days to form a coalition government, which provides some evidence that
diffusion has caused greater stress to the Belgian state. N-VA did not have to govern the country
after 2010 despite being the largest party in Belgium, but the burden remains with N-VA because
the party will need to prove to the electorate that they can obtain greater powers for Flanders. An
unsatisfactory state reform may cause significant problems for the party and could see a reversal
of nationalist/secessionist support towards VB. Another element of N-VA’s rise is that the party
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has not ultimately gained independence and for voters that vehemently purport separation from
Flanders, unless success comes, support could erode. However, taken cumulatively, the
combined support of N-VA and VB is close to a majority in Flanders and the forthcoming
elections—scheduled for 2014—will again present a sense of pressure on the Belgian political
system.
On the first question on nationalist/secessionist party diffusion with regards to policy
platforms, VB staked out a position as a more extreme party in favor of rights for ethnic
Flemings and Dutch speakers. N-VA moved to the center with more moderate policy positions
on a range of different issues. The platform of independence, then, was displayed in a political
package much closer to the center of the political spectrum, than more towards the extreme as
was the case historically with VB.

Conclusion
Although the diffusion of nationalist political parties in Flanders and Quebec has not yet
created an independent state for either territory, the concept of diffusion presents a new
challenge for the governments of Belgium and Canada. Support for nationalist/secessionist
political parties in Quebec and Flanders is between 35 and 45 percent, which shows that the
contestation of the state remains.
In Belgium, the growth of N-VA into the largest single political party in the country has
led to significant challenges to the integrity of the state. Following the 2007 federal election, it
took 196 days to form a government; following 2010, 541 days. Unless N-VA becomes less
popular in Flanders, it may again be challenging to put forth another coalition government in
Belgium post-2014 federal election results. This does not mean that Belgium will split into two
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(or more) sections, but that there is pressure for such an outcome on the part of Flemish
nationalists/secessionists from both VB and N-VA.
In Canada, the diffusion of nationalist parties has not yet dramatically affected politics in
Quebec. However, the emergence of QS has decreased support for the traditional powers at the
provincial level—the PQ and the PLQ—as well as the emergent third party—the CAQ, which
followed the ADQ. QS is not yet a viable contender for power in Quebec, but members of the
party argue that it presents an alternative to the traditional model of politics in Quebec. The PQ
remains powerful in Quebec, but the party has declined from its historic high in 1981 and
consistent support above 40 percent, typically obtained in elections before 1998.
Neither Canada nor Belgium is in any imminent threat of secession or dissolution, but the
diffusion of nationalist parties presents a thought provoking twist for policymakers in Ottawa
and Brussels who support the continuation of their respective states. If QS continues to grow in
Quebec and the PQ maintains its current level of support, then federalist parties will see an
erosion of votes. Likewise, if N-VA continues to grow or if VB increases back to its 2004
regional election level of almost one-quarter of Flemish voters, then Belgium will be similarly
contested.
In both cases, it has become clear that political space within the political spectrum exists.
In the parliamentary system, especially in systems that utilize proportional representation
(Lijphart 1991) as in the case of Belgium, new parties emerge quite frequently. The case of
Quebec in Canada shows that even in the parliamentary system where a plurality voting system
is used, new parties can also emerge—although it has quite to be seen whether new parties can
emerge and do well in a region or country, at least on a more regular basis. The diffusion of
nationalist/secessionist political parties shows that the idea of independence is one that remains
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highly important to the politics of the region, and that new nationalist/secessionist political
parties have adopted a platform from an existing nationalist/secessionist political party.
Overall, there is evidence that the diffusion of secession as a policy platform has occurred
in both Quebec and Flanders. This diffusion of the idea and policy platform continues to present
challenges for Canada and Belgium respectively. However, given the results of a limited number
of elections, there is mixed evidence that the diffusion of the idea further threatens the state; in
Quebec, support for nationalist/secessionist parties has decreased since the emergence of a new
political party, but in Flanders, support for nationalist/secessionist parties has increased. Support
for the independence of Flanders has increased, but the Belgian state is not in an imminent state
of danger. The 2014 general is approaching, though, which will provide further evidence as to
the importance of diffusion to nationalism and secession in the developed world.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES AND LOCATIONS

January 6, 2010:
Richard Marceau (BQ), Ottawa, Ontario
January 7, 2010:
Jonathan Valois (PQ), Montreal, Quebec
Genevieve Mathieu (PQ), Montreal, Quebec (on phone in Quebec City, Quebec)
January 8, 2010:
Pierre Paquette (BQ), Montreal, Quebec

April 9, 2010:
Philip Claeys (VB), Brussels, Flemish Brabant
April 13, 2010:
Jan Laeremans (VB), Grimbergen, Flemish Brabant
April 14, 2010:
Pieter Logghe (VB), Brussels, Flemish Brabant
April 16, 2010:
Tomas Verachtert (VB), Brussels, Flemish Brabant
April 20, 2010:
Jan Jambon (N-VA), Brussels, Flemish Brabant
April 22, 2010:
Jan Lievens (VB), Brussels, Flemish Brabant
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April 23, 2010:
Jan Peumans (N-VA), Brussels, Flemish Brabant
April 26, 2010:
Tanguy Veys (VB), Brussels, Flemish Brabant
April 27, 2010:
Kris Van Dijck (N-VA), Brussels, Flemish Brabant
April 28, 2010:
Hagen Goyvaerts (VB), Leuven, Flemish Brabant
April 29, 2010:
Raf Liedts (VB), Antwerp, Antwerp
April 30, 2010:
Steven Utsi (VB), Brussels, Flemish Brabant
Erik Bucquoye (VB), Leuven, Flemish Brabant
May 3, 2010:
Ludwig Caluwe (CD&V), Brussels, Flemish Brabant
May 6, 2010:
Erik Van In (N-VA), Brugge, West Flanders
May 12, 2010:
Karim Van Overmeire (VB), Brussels, Flemish Brabant
May 13, 2010:
Theo Francken (N-VA), Leuven, Flemish Brabant
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June 21, 2010:
Richard Nadeau (BQ), Gatineau, Quebec
Carole Poirier (PQ), Montreal, Quebec
June 23, 2010:
Guy LaChapelle (BQ), Montreal, Quebec
Martin LeMay (PQ), Montreal, Quebec
June 24, 2010:
Daniel Turp (PQ), Montreal, Quebec
June 25, 2010:
Etienne-Alexis Boucher (PQ), Windsor, Quebec

30

